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We examine the effect of online consumer reviews on the sales of video games. An inherent 
problem in measuring the influence of reviews on demand is that products receiving good reviews 
tend to be of high quality, and it is difficult to determine whether the review or the quality is 
responsible for the high demand. To circumvent this problem, we consider video games that are 
developed for both PlayStation 2 and Xbox and take a differences-in-differences approach to a 
structural model of game demand. Our results indicate that online consumer reviews have a 
significant influence on the sales of the video games. On average, one point increase in the 
average rating is associated with 4% increase in game sales. Negative ratings have a larger 
impact than positive ratings. In addition, we find that online reviews are more influential for less 
popular games. These results suggest the importance of managing online word of mouth for firms, 
especially for their less popular products. 
Keywords:  Online consumer review; word of mouth; online forum; Internet marketing 
 
Introduction 
Word of mouth (WOM) has long been recognized as an important driver of consumer demand for experience goods 
(goods for which the quality is uncertain prior to consumption) (Katz and Lazarsfeld 1955, Nelson 1970). Earlier 
studies on WOM have examined personal influence on consumers’ adoption behavior (e.g. Katz and Lazarsfeld 
1955, Coleman et al. 1966), as well as the linkage between professional reviews and the demand for the products 
(Litman 1983, Litman and Kohl 1989, Sochay 1994). Sometimes the influence of WOM could be so large that 
consumers may choose to optimally ignore their private signals and rely entirely on the information from others (e.g. 
Benerjee 1992, 1993; Ellison and Fudenberg 1995). However, conventional WOM communication is only effective 
within limited geographic boundaries or time span. 
With the growing popularity of the Internet, the Internet has become an important source for consumers to obtain 
product information and user feedback. Studies have shown that Internet technologies, such as search engines or 
shopbots, could significantly reduce search costs (e.g. Bakos 1997; Brynjolfsson and Smith 2000). Online review 
systems complement these technologies as consumers could use feedback from other users to discover product 
quality and the fit between the product and their tastes. As a result, online reviews are particularly useful for 
experience goods. A report by Forrester Research shows that approximately 50% of young Internet surfers rely on 
WOM recommendations to purchase experience goods such as CDs, movies, videos or DVDs, and games (Godes 
and Mayzlin 2004; Walsh 2000). 
Online reviews differ from conventional communication in several aspects. First, online reviews or discussions are 
recorded on various Web sites and can be easily retrieved by consumers or researchers in a later date. The ability to 
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trace the dates of incidences of WOM makes it easy to study WOM in a dynamic setting (Godes and Mayzlin 2004; 
Dellarocas et al. 2005; Chevalier and Mayzlin forthcoming). Second, unlike professional reviews, online reviews are 
often submitted by individual consumers. Thus, they should be more useful in examining “popular appeal” instead 
of “professional judgment” (Holbrook 1999). A survey by BizRate.com suggests that more than 50% of respondents 
consider consumer-generated reviews more valuable than expert reviews (Piller 1999). Finally, the Internet offers 
great efficiency and flexibility — anyone can potentially share her experience with millions of Internet users and 
influence their decisions through online WOM regardless of geographic boundaries. 
As a result, one would expect that with the proliferation of online review systems, online reviews could be a good 
proxy for overall WOM and may significantly influence the demand for experience goods. The effectiveness of 
online reviews, however, could be very limited for a couple of reasons. First, as reviewers are not drawn from a 
random sample of the user population, their opinions may not reflect the preference of the general population. 
Anderson (1998) finds that extremely satisfied and extremely dissatisfied customers are more likely to initiate WOM 
transfers. Li and Hitt (2004) find potential bias in consumer reviews in early product introduction periods. Second, 
online forums can be manipulated by interested parties. Owners of the forums may design the Web sites to 
advantage their sponsors. Firms can anonymously post online reviews to praise their products or to increase the 
awareness of the products (Dellarocas forthcoming; Mayzlin 2006). Potential buyers may therefore heavily discount 
online reviews. Consequently, online reviews may not affect product sales. 
The limited empirical evidence to date has provided mixed results. For instance, Chevalier and Mayzlin 
(forthcoming)’s study on online book reviews, Resnick and Zeckhauser (2002)’s study on eBay’s reputation 
profiles, and Zhang (2006)’s study on online movie reviews find that online consumer ratings have significant 
impact on sales. However, Chen et al. (2004)’s study on online book reviews and Duan et al. (2005)’s study on 
online movie reviews challenge this view and suggest only the volume of the reviews matters. 
The purpose of this paper is to measure the influence of online consumer reviews on the sales of video games. An 
inherent problem in measuring the influence of reviews on demand is that products receiving positive reviews tend 
to be of high quality. Since the quality is often unobserved by researchers, it is difficult to determine whether the 
review or the quality is responsible for the high demand. Therefore, the positive correlations found in some of the 
earlier studies between reviews and product sales could be spurious. Recent studies have proposed several methods 
to circumvent this endogeneity problem. For example, in the context of movies, Einav (forthcoming) and Zhang 
(2006) use fixed effects specifications to control for unobserved movie quality. An underlying assumption of these 
fixed-effects specifications is that consumer tastes for the product are time-invariant and such assumption is often 
too strong. Godes and Mayzlin (2004) use lagged independent variables to circumvent the endogeneity issue. Their 
approach has to assume that the unobserved quality is not serially correlated. Elberse and Eliashberg (2003) propose 
a simultaneous-equations model to address the simultaneity of audience expectation and number of screens. Dubois 
and Nauges (2006), extending the framework proposed by Levinsohn and Petrin (2003), exploit a structural 
assumption about the omitted quality variable to control for the unobserved quality of wines. Other researchers have 
used “differences-in-differences” methods to eliminate quality signals. Reinstein and Snyder (2005) take advantage 
of the timing of critics’ reviews relative to a movie’s release and finds that the measured influence effect is small 
though still detectable. Chevalier and Mayzlin (forthcoming) examine book reviews and sales ranks on Amazon.com 
and BN.com at several time points to control for book-specific and book-site-specific effects. 
Similar to the approach in Chevalier and Mayzlin (forthcoming), our empirical analysis hinges on the video games 
that are released on two different consoles: PlayStation 2 and Xbox. We apply a differences-in-differences approach 
to a structural model of game demand to circumvent the endogeneity problem. By taking the differences between the 
sales of the same game title on the two consoles, we eliminate unobserved game characteristics that may impact both 
reviews and sales. By examining the differences across consoles over time, we control for the taste differences 
between the console-installed bases that may influence both reviews and sales. Our paper contains several major 
differences from Chevalier and Mayzlin (2005). First, we employ a discrete choice model of demand to capture 
substitution among different games, whereas Chevalier and Mayzlin (forthcoming) do not consider such effects.1  
Second, Chevalier and Mayzlin (forthcoming) use ranks from two different ranking systems to approximate book 
sales. As ranks for books with very low sales are not disclosed at BN.com, their sample is truncated. In addition, 
ranks could be poor measures of sales of infrequently purchased books. We use actual sales data. Third, Chevalier 
                                                          
1Possible substitution effects for books could come from other books in the same category or used books in the second-hand book market on 
Amazon.com. 
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and Mayzlin (forthcoming) look at how reviews on Amazon.com and BN.com affect book sales at both Web 
retailers. As a result, their analysis has to control for effects across the two sites. In our case, as the two consoles are 
incompatible with each other and most game players only own one console, we do not have such concerns. In 
addition, as our analysis matches review data from a Web site that does not sell games directly to aggregate game 
sales, our approach is likely to be free from manipulation of the review or ranking systems by the site owner.2  
We also examine the differential effects of online reviews on popular and less popular games. Online reviews 
substitute and complement offline WOM communication about product quality. Therefore, when quality 
information is readily available from other channels, we expect decreased reliance on online reviews. In the context 
of video games, consumer awareness of popular games is likely to be high, as these games are frequently featured in 
game magazines or in-store demos and discussed among friends. As a result, when making purchase decisions, 
consumers may not resort to online review systems for quality information, or are less influenced by online reviews. 
Likewise, we expect increased reliance on online reviews for less popular games. We therefore hypothesize that 
online reviews have a greater influence on product sales for less popular products than for popular products. 
Our empirical results support the view that online WOM affects consumers’ purchasing behavior. We find that the 
average rating of the reviews has significant influence on the sales of video games — on average, one point increase 
in the valence leads to 4% increase in sales. We also find that online reviews are more important for less popular 
games. These results also suggest that at least some aspects of online WOM are proxies for overall WOM. Given the 
operational advantages of measuring online WOM, firms could use online reviews to proactively manage WOM, 
especially for less popular products (Chen and Xie 2005). 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we give background information on the cross-
platform development in the video game market. Then we establish the empirical model and discuss the data sources 
for this study. We report and discuss the results in the next section. Finally, we present the implications of our 
results and conclude. 
 
Cross-platform Development in the Video Game Industry  
The video game industry is an over ten billion dollar industry in the United States. Manufacturers of video game 
consoles face a “two-sided market”: game players value video consoles for the number of game titles they are 
associated with and game publishers value consoles for their installed bases (e.g. Evans (2003)). 
Both sides of the market are characterized by intense inter- and intra-generation competition. Schilling (2003) 
provides an overview of the evolution of the video game industry. Today the most popular consoles in the market 
are Sony’s PlayStation 2, Nintendo’s GameCube, and Microsoft’s Xbox 360. Sony has dominated the 128-bit 
console market, with the PlayStation 2 accounting for 55.6% of console installed base.3  
Development is normally funded by a publisher. The average cost of developing a contemporary video game is 
about seven million dollars (Montagne 2006). A game can take from one to three years to develop depending on the 
genre, scale, development platform, and amount of assets.  
In the early days, most game titles were only developed for a single console. Whenever the game was ported to a 
new console, a different team would have to rewrite the entire game. Assembly language, a human-readable notation 
for the machine language, was used to write most games at that time as it optimizes the processing speed and 
requires very little overhead. 
Today, as processing speed is no longer a critical issue, high-level languages such as C++ become the most popular 
game development languages (Goodwin 2005). In addition, although libraries for different consoles are not 
compatible with each other, game developers can take advantage of cross-platform middleware platforms (e.g. 
Criterion’s Renderware 3D development platform) to program a game in a single language and have the game run 
on several consoles. Publishers no longer see cross-platform development as an option to do later. Instead, they 
often mandate the developers to release games on all three major console platforms simultaneously. It is quite 
                                                          
2Indeed, Chevalier and Mayzlin (forthcoming) find that Amazon has been active in pruning reviews. Chen and Xie (2005) discusses firms’ 
various strategic responses to third party product reviews. 
3Source: The NPD Group as of March 2006. http://www.us.playstation.com/PressReleases.aspx?id=338, accessed April 2006. 
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common today to see an advertisement for a new game with the plethora of logos at the end: “PlayStation 2, Xbox, 
GameCube” (Reimer 2005). 
 
Model 
Demand Model for Video Games 
We estimate a nested logit demand model for games. Assume there are J games available on console k and an 
outside option labeled 0. We place the J games in one group, g, and the outside option in another group by itself. 
The perceived utility of player i from purchasing a game j, j∈[1,J], at time t is a function of game characteristics 
(ξjt
k), the vector of lagged review variables (Rj,t-1
k), price (pjt








ζjgtk represents player utility common to all games of group g.  νijt
k is an i.i.d. extreme-value distributed error term 
that represents player i’s idiosyncratic taste for games in group g. The parameter σ∈[0,1) measures the correlation of 
unobserved utility among games in the same group. When σ→1, games within a group are perfect substitutes, 
whereas when σ=0 they are independent and we have the simple logit model. 
We normalize the utility from the outside good to be zero. We denote the market share of game j as sj and the 
market share for game j within group g as sj|g. Following Berry (1994) and Cardell (1997), the demand equation for 
the nested logit model can be derived as:  
 ln(sjt)-ln(s0t)=β0+β1pjt+Rj,t-1Γ+σln(sjt|g)+ξjt (2) 
Identification 
Given the panel structure of data, we decompose the unobservable component ξjt





where θjt is a game-specific component which is the same for the same game across different platforms but can vary 
over time and ηj
k is the console-specific effect. The former is related to factors such as promotions by game 
publishers, the brands of the game publishers, and the quality of the games. The latter is to capture the difference in 
players’ tastes of the consoles and the fit between game j and console k. Even for the same game title, players’ utility 
may be different due to difference in console characteristics such as clock speed. Therefore, ηj
k is time invariant but 
may vary across games on the same console. εjt
k is an i.i.d. normal error term varying across games and over time. 
We restrict our analysis to games that are developed for two console systems, Sony’s PlayStation 2 and Microsoft’s 
Xbox, for a couple of reasons. First, PlayStation 2 and Xbox were the two largest players in the console market and 
had the largest game libraries during the period for which we have review data. Second, both consoles target at 
adults between 18 and 34, positioning themselves directly against each other. Therefore, we expect the two gaming 
populations to be very similar to each other. Table 1 compares features of the two consoles. The only major 
differences between the two consoles are the clock speed and the amount of memory.  
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We use the size of installed base of each console as the potential market. The within-group market shares, ln(sjt|gp) 
and ln(sjt|gx), are by definition endogenous and require instrument variables. Following Einav (forthcoming), we 
use the number of games available for each console at time t as the instrument for the within-group market share. A 
large number of games implies intense competition, and therefore should be negatively associated with the within 
group share. 
  θjt contains both observed and unobserved game-specific characteristics. The unobserved characteristics are likely 
to be correlated with independent variables. Omitting these unobserved effects would produce biased coefficients. 
As θjt is the same across console systems, we eliminate the game-specific effects by differencing the data across 
consoles:  















∆ηj, which captures the differences in console-specific effects, is also unobserved but does not vary over time. As 
the console differences might affect differences in game prices and reviews, we take an additional difference 
between period t and t+∆t and have:  
 ∆∆Mj,t=β1(∆∆pj,t)+(∆∆Rj,t-1)Γ+σ(∆∆WGSj,t)+εj,t (6) 
Equation (6) is our empirical specification. In our analysis, we use ∆t=1 but our results are robust to the choice of ∆t. 
 
Data 
Data on console sales and game sales come from the NPD Fun Group, a leading market research firm that tracks this 
industry. NPD collects data from approximately 17 leading U.S. retail chains that account for 80% of the U.S. 
market. From these data, NPD formulates estimates of sales figures for the entire U.S. market. We obtain monthly 
data for PlayStation 2 and Xbox and their associated games up to October 2005. For each game, we compute the 
average monthly price by dividing the monthly dollar value of sales by the volume of units sold. 
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We gather review data from GameSpot.com (also known as VideoGames.com). According to Ranking.com, 
GameSpot.com is the 172th most visited site among all Web domains and is the most popular one on video games.4  
GameSpot publishes three kinds of reviews: editors’ reviews, players’ reviews, and reviews from other sources. 
Editors at GameSpot review most games on or around the day on which they ship to retail channels. In March 2003, 
GameSpot started to publish player reviews. To ensure the quality of these reviews, only GameSpot paid subscribers 
or users who have sufficient level of experience (as demonstrated by their participation in other parts of the site such 
as forums) could post reviews. At most one review is allowed from the same login name for a given game. These 
policies minimize the potential manipulation of the review system and ensure that reviews are of high quality. 
Reviewers also use a scale ranging from 1 to 10 for their reviews, with 10 being the best and 1 being the absolute 
worst, for each of the five aspects (gameplay, graphics, sound, value, and tilt). For each review, GameSpot publishes 
ratings for each aspect as well as their average. We use the average rating of all five aspects in our analysis. In 
addition, GameSpot collects critics’ reviews from other sources such as Yahoo!  Games and Hardcore Gamer 
Magazine, and publishes aggregate scores based on these reviews. Most of these reviews are published within a 
month after the release of the games. The reviews by the editors at GameSpot and from other sources are rarely 
updated after they are published, and therefore provide little variation over time. Their effects are eliminated in our 
differences-in-differences estimation. The player reviews, however, vary both across consoles and over time, and are 
the focus of our analysis.5  Even for the same game titles, player reviews are often different across consoles. 
For each game in each month before October 2005, we collect its average rating, the coefficient of variation of the 
ratings, the total number of reviews, and the average length of the reviews. The average rating reflects the level of 
consumer satisfaction. The coefficient of variation is measured as the ratio of the standard deviation to the mean 
rating. It is a unitless measure of rating dispersion that allows comparison of degree of disagreement among games 
with different mean ratings. We also include the total number of reviews as a measure of the volume of discussions. 
Chen et al. (2004) find as the number of posts increases, the overall rating converges to the true quality. Therefore, 
from a visitor’s point of view, a large number of reviews may be associated with more accurate reflection of the 
quality of a game. The number of reviews may also signal the popularity of the game. As games, in particular those 
can be played online, may exhibit direct network effects, players’ willingness to purchase a game may increase with 
the number of players who own the same game. The review content often contains additional information. However, 
these data tend to be costly to collect and difficult to interpret quantitatively (Godes and Mayzlin 2004; Chevalier 
and Mayzlin forthcoming);. Therefore, we only include a cost-effective measure, the length of reviews, measured by 
the total number of typed characters. These four metrics have been used in previous studies on reviews. For 
example, Zhang (2006) uses the average rating of the reviews and the coefficient of variation of the ratings. Cheng 
and Fay (2003) use the number of ratings. Chevalier and Mayzlin (forthcoming) examine the average length of the 
reviews. 
Although GameSpot offers a convenient way to measure online WOM, its reviews may not be representative for all 
online opinions on specific games. Players could also obtain review information from other channels such as online 
bulletin boards and chat rooms. This potential sample-selection bias, however, would weaken the estimated 
relationship between online reviews and sales, and would strengthen our argument. 
We merge the sales data with the review data to obtain the final data set. 
 
Results 
Our final data set consists of 159 game titles that are released for both PlayStation 2 and Xbox. Twenty-nine of them 
are released on different dates for the two consoles and are removed from the sample.6  Similar to other empirical 
studies that use discrete choice models of product differentiation (e.g. Argentesi and Filistrucchi forthcoming, Einav 
forthcoming, Rysman 2004), a natural concern is the assumption of single purchase — each consumer purchases at 
most one game in each period. This seems to be a reasonable assumption in the case of video games. According to a 
recent survey, more than 80% of consumers on average purchase one game or less in each month (Pidgeon and Hu 
2003). Consumers’ purchase frequency, however, could exhibit seasonal patterns. Figure 1 shows mean revenue and 
                                                          
4http://www.ranking.com, accessed April 2006. Ranking.com tracks the popularity of the top one million Web domains. 
5We also looked at other less popular game Web sites such as IGN.com. Almost all of them only provide professional reviews. 
6Including these 29 games does not change our results. 
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mean units sold by month for all games over the sampling period. As our data on monthly game sales exhibit strong 
holiday effects, we remove observations in November and December from our data set. 
 
Table 2 provides summary statistics for games in our sample. A t-test indicates that both the monthly unit sales of 
games and the monthly average number of games on PlayStation 2 are significantly greater than those on Xbox. The 
result is consistent with the larger installed base of PlayStation 2 console and the strong indirect network effects 
documented in Clements and Ohashi (2005). The prices for games on the two consoles are at about the same level, 
most likely due to the intense competition among game titles on each console. 
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Table 3 presents the summary statistics of reviews as of October 2005. The data suggest that reviews are 
overwhelmingly positive for games on both consoles. Similar patterns have been observed in other context such as 
book reviews at Amazon (Chevalier and Mayzlin forthcoming) and reputation profiles at eBay (Resnick and 
Zeckhauser 2002). On average, we have more than ten reviews for each game. However, the distribution of the 
number of reviews is skewed. The number of reviews ranges from 1 to 63 for games on PlayStation 2 and from 1 to 
104 for those on Xbox. The minimum length of these reviews is 540, indicating that each review has been carefully 
written. We find no significant difference in any of the four metrics between the two consoles, suggesting that the 
two gaming populations are quite similar.7   
Figure 2 shows the mean prices, units sold, and ratings for games on PlayStation 2 and Xbox respectively. In all 
three figures, the patterns for PlayStation 2 and for Xbox are quite similar. Both average price and average units sold 
are declining over time. The average price declines almost linearly during the first 10 months, and the average units 
sold drops significantly for the first few months.8  Average ratings in the first couple of months are significantly 
higher than those in later months. This pattern suggests the existence of self-selection bias in the reviews, and is 
similar to that reported in Dellarocas et al. (2005) and Li and Hitt (2004). One possible explanation is that hard-core 
aficionados tend to buy the games immediately after they are released, and these aficionados tend to like the games 
more than other gamers. The variance of the mean ratings increases over time as we have fewer reviews for old 
games. 9 
 
                                                          
7One concern is that the same reviews may be posted for both consoles and as a result, reviews from the two gaming populations are artificially 
very similar. We check this possibility and find that only 3.3% of the reviews are posted for both consoles. 
8As many games are not released during the first days in the month, mean units sold during the first month of the release for games on both 
consoles appear relatively low. 
9The average life cycle of all games is about 33 months. 
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We now proceed to test the influence of consumer reviews on game demand. Table 4 presents the regression results 
based on the differences-in-differences specification. We use the differences of ln(sjt)-ln(s0t) across consoles and 
over time as the dependent variables in all models. In Model I, we use the differences-in-differences measures of 
price, average rating of the reviews and within group share of the games. In Model II, we add other review variables 
such as the differences-in-differences measures of the variation of the ratings, the number of reviews, and the 
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average length of the reviews. We take the natural logarithm of these independent variables10 . The results indicate 
that higher prices decrease sales while greater average ratings improve sales. Model III and IV focus on different 
ways of measuring review valence. We replace the average rating of the reviews with the fractions of ratings that are 
above 9 (“superb" based on GameSpot interpretation) and below 4 (“bad"). While the coefficients for the fraction of 
“superb" ratings are positive, they are not significant. The coefficients for the fraction of “bad" ratings are 
significantly negative. In addition, they are greater in absolute value than those for the “superb" ratings, indicating 
that negative ratings carry more weight.        
 
We also find that the number of reviews has positive effects, albeit at a lower significance level. One possible 
explanation is that a large number of reviews signal the popularity of the game, and because of direct network 
effects, players are more likely to purchase games owned by many others. In addition, the length of the reviews does 
not affect sales. Its coefficients are negative and insignificant in all models. This suggests that reviewers may use 
longer explanations to express “mixed” opinions. Panel A in Table 5 suggests that as the ratings get higher, the 
average length of reviews is generally increasing. But for the dominating range (ratings in the high range between 8 
and 10), the average length of reviews is actually shorter than that of ratings between 6 and 8. Regression results in 
Panel B support this observation. Regressing the length of reviews on the rating, we have three simple models. 
Model I takes the rating as the only independent variable, and the parameter estimate is not significant. Model II 
adds the square of the rating as another independent variable to account for possible curvilinear relationship, and 
both variables are significant, suggesting that longer reviews are used for mixed opinions. Model III adds to the 
previous model a dummy variable for PlayStation 2 games. The insignificant parameter estimate suggests that the 
result is robust across the consoles, and it gives support that the reviewers on the two platforms are very similar. A 
simple calculation reveals that games with ratings around 6.9 tend to receive the longest reviews.  
                                                          
10We use the logarithms of (the number of reviews + 1), (the average length of the reviews + 1) and (the standard deviation + 1) to handle zero 
reviews and ratings with no variation. 
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From the regression results in Table 5, we can also compute the demand elasticities with respect to prices and 
ratings. We include the detailed derivation for computing the elasticities in the appendix. We find that on average, 
the price elasticity is -1.8 and the rating elasticity is 0.31 (based on Model II). In addition, on average one dollar 
increase in price leads to 7 percent drop in game sales, and one point increase in average rating leads to 4 percent 
increase in game sales. 
We now examine the differential effects of reviews on popular and less popular games. For each game, we first 
compute its average monthly sales in the first three months after its release. We then calculate the mean of these 
average monthly sales of all games. We consider games whose average performance in the first three months is 
above the mean performance as popular games and the rest of the games as less popular ones. Games that are 
released in the last two months of our data set (i.e., September 2005 and October 2005) are thus dropped from the 
analysis. We choose the first three months’ sales as the indicator for game popularity as the first three months’ sales 
typically account for more than 40% total sales for a game title. In addition, this choice allows us to use most of the 
data in our sample. Other time windows such as half year provide very similar results. We repeat our regression 
analysis for each group and report the results in Table 6. 
We find that for popular games, the coefficients on the rating variables, albeit having the right signs, are 
insignificant. For less popular games, the coefficients of the rating variables are greater in absolute value than those 
reported in Table 4. The coefficients of average rating and fraction of “bad" ratings are statistically significant. 
These results suggest that online reviews are more influential for less popular products. The significance of the 
number of reviews disappears for less popular games, most likely due to the fact that most of these games do not 
have network capability and thus exhibit little direct network effects. 
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Conclusions 
The Internet has fostered an explosion of new ways for people to communicate with each other, and online 
discussion forums allowed people to exchange ideas with total strangers. These new ways of communication pose 
both challenges and opportunities to the firms. On one hand, it is intimidating to manage the reputation profile 
generated from the WOM process of thousands of people who are complete strangers to each other. On the other 
hand, the Internet provides the companies with a way to record, retrieve, and measure the reputation profiles. 
 Understanding how consumers react to online reviews is of vital importance to firms who rely on WOM to 
disseminate information about their products. This paper has examined, in the context of video games, the impact of 
online consumer reviews on sales. We find that for the games in our sample, the consumer reviews influence the 
product sales, even after eliminating the unobservable game-specific characteristics and controlling for possible 
heterogeneities in consumer tastes across the console platforms. Specifically, we estimate that a one-point increase 
in a game’s online average rating on average leads to a 4% increase in its sales in the following month. These 
findings are consistent with the survey results reported in Bounie (2005) that as most gamers are young and have 
limited income, they frequently use online reviews to avoid bad purchases. We also find that for less popular games, 
the estimated impact of online ratings is even higher, suggesting WOM playing a bigger role for less popular games. 
These results suggest that online reviews complement offline WOM. It is therefore important for firms to design 
effective online marketing strategies, especially for their less popular products. For example, firms could use 
promotional chats or invite users to review their products to increase the awareness of their products. 
There are several directions in extending this work. First, if online reviews provide useful information for firms and 
consumers, how could we elicit more user contribution?  It is not yet clear what motivates the reviewers to write 
these reviews. Most of the potential payoffs discussed in the case of open source communities (e.g. user need for 
particular software and career advancement (Lerner and Tirole 2002; Lerner and Tirole 2005; Von Hippel 2001)) are 
either weak or not applicable here. 
Second, future research could look into the differences between online and offline WOM. One eminent difference is 
that online reviews can be more easily manipulated, as sources of these online reviews are usually anonymous 
(Dellarocas forthcoming). 11  If the market for online reviews is efficient, then any inflation or deflation in product 
reputation should be adjusted by the consumers quickly such that in the long run, there are no gains to distorting the 
reviews. Although our paper finds evidence that there maybe financial reasons for the firms to bias the reviews, it is 
not necessary that firms manipulating reviews can obtain advantages in the long run, as consumers’ reaction to 
inflated reviews may negatively affect the firms’ profitability. It is thus interesting to examine how this interaction 
plays out over time. 
Third, future research could compare the influence of online reviews among multiple products. We believe that the 
strength of the influence is correlated with the size of user population being online. 
 Finally, product-level marketing data may help us study the best practices of managing online WOM. 
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